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Abstract
This paper focuses on financial incentives rewarding successful
implementation of guidelines in the UK National Health Service (NHS). In
particular, it assesses the implementation of National Institute for Health and
Clinical Excellence (NICE) venous thrombo-embolism (VTE) guidance in 2010
on the risk assessment and secondary prevention of VTE in hospital in-patients
and the financial incentives driving successful implementation introduced by
the Commissioning for Quality and Innovation for Payment Framework
(CQUIN) for 2010-2011. We systematically compared the implementation of
evidence-based national guidance on VTE prevention across two specialities
(general medicine and orthopaedics) in four hospital sites in the greater South
West of England by auditing and evaluating VTE prevention activity for 2009
(i.e. before the 2010 NICE guideline) and late 2010 (almost a year after the
guideline was published). Analysis of VTE prevention activity reported in 816
randomly selected orthopaedic and general medical in-patient medical records
was complemented by a qualitative study into the practical responses to
revised national guidance. This paper’s contribution to knowledge is to suggest
that by financially rewarding the implementation of national guidance on VTE
prevention, paradoxes and contradictions have become apparent between the
‘payment by volume system’ of Healthcare Resource Groups and the ‘payment
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Background to incentive payments in the NHS
Diagnostic Related Groups (DRGs) offered health organisations the 
ability to understand provider activity in terms of how many patients 
they cared for and their case-mix. They allowed activity compari-
son within and between different organisations as well as providing 
a means of making longitudinal analyses of trends in treatment and 
service provision. Local adaptations or variants of diagnosis related 
groups (DRGs) have been adopted as the unit of payments to hospi-
tals in many health systems1. This is a system that classifies hospital 
cases into identifiable groups in order to identify ‘products’ that a 
hospital provides. The system was originally developed in the USA 
in order to replace ‘cost-based’ reimbursement. DRGs are based 
on the International Classification of Diseases (ICD) and the pres-
ence of complications or co-morbidity. This model of classification 
has spread to other countries including Australia, Denmark, France, 
Germany, Austria, the Netherlands and Russia; followed by a less 
rapid spread from acute care into long-term care and psychiatry2.
In England, the NHS Plan of July 2000 introduced the government’s 
intention to link the allocation of hospital funds to the activity they 
undertake – a system of payment by results (PbR)3. PbR under-
pinned the NHS reform agenda and was formally implemented by 
The Department of Health in 2002 as a mechanism to reimburse 
hospitals in England for levels of activity undertaken. Under this 
new system of PbR hospitals were reimbursed for activities un-
dertaken using a fixed price tariff that reflected national average 
prices for hospital procedures4. Such prices are standardised across 
the NHS with adjustments for higher labour costs in London. The 
main aim of PbR was to improve efficiency and increase value for 
money in the NHS by enhancing service quality, facilitating patient 
choice, enabling service innovation, improving quality of service 
and reducing waiting times by rewarding healthcare providers for 
the volumes of work completed.
PbR has continued to be implemented in the NHS (albeit incremen-
tally) both in terms of scope and financial impact. The first NHS 
foundation trust (FT) applicants moved to the full PbR system in 
2005–06 and other NHS trusts in 2006–074. In 2006–2007 PbR was 
extended to include non-elective, outpatient and emergency admis-
sions for all trusts5. In 2009–2010, the national tariff for admitted 
patient care and outpatient activity was for the first time defined in 
terms of Healthcare Resource Groups (HRGs), an English variant 
of DRGs. The Department of Health in the UK defines HRGs as 
groupings of treatment episodes that are similar in resource use and 
clinical response. They are a standard method of analysing clinical 
procedures and thereby classification of hospital activity6 HRGs are 
reviewed every four years to ensure they accurately reflect clinical 
practice.
Although the imposition of payment by results was intended as a 
fair and consistent basis for hospital funding it also rewards hos-
pitals by volume of work completed. Its overarching aim was to 
allow the commissioning of activity volumes that were required to 
deliver service priorities from a plurality of providers on the basis 
of a standard, national pricing tariff. By standardising prices, it was 
intended to promote non-price competition, i.e. provider differen-
tiation on the basis of service quality4.
NHS commissioners therefore faced a very challenging agenda. 
They needed to secure high quality services which remained safe 
for patients, whilst at the same time trying to achieve best value for 
the budgets available.
The CQUIN (Commissioning for Quality and 
Innovation) framework
Further policy aims were in play however. Commissioning spe-
cifically to improve clinical quality and safety required additional 
incentive frameworks through which improvements could be moni-
tored and additional drivers for change generated. Alongside the 
more traditional payment by results (volume), there was appar-
ently a need to develop more effective patient experience metrics 
and use these to improve quality and safety. Lord Darzi’s review of 
the NHS: “High Quality Care for All”7 included a commitment to 
make providers’ income linked to quality of care performance. This 
commitment led to the creation of the Commissioning for Quality 
and Innovation (CQUIN) payment framework, introduced nation-
ally in 2009 to help local commissioners identify and agree quality 
improvement schemes. It enabled commissioners to reward excel-
lence by linking a proportion of healthcare providers’ income to the 
achievement of local quality improvement goals8. CQUIN targets 
introduced for VTE in 2010–11 included a financial incentive for 
reaching a 90% threshold for venous thrombo-embolism (VTE) 
risk assessment of all adult hospital in-patients. Compliance was 
to be measured through a monthly audit of patients who received 
appropriate thrombo-prophylaxis after risk assessment.
Why did CQUIN focus on VTE?
It has been over 23 years since the first evidence-based guidelines9 
recommended routine use of thromboprophylaxis for most hospi-
talised patients but there continue to be large gaps in the provision 
of this key patient safety intervention. Venous thromboembolism 
continues to be a major and often unrecognised cause of morbidity 
and mortality in hospitalised patients10. Over one-third of hospi-
tal in-patients are at risk of developing venous thrombo-embolism 
(VTE)11. This is a condition where a blood clot forms in a vein and 
travels through the bloodstream to the lungs, where it often proves 
fatal.
More recently, national efforts to reduce avoidable deaths from 
VTE recommenced in 2005, when the House of Commons Health 
Select Committee estimated that over 25,000 patients admitted to 
hospital died each year from preventable VTE11. The Committee 
cited evidence that many deaths might had been avoided if patients 
had been properly assessed for risk of VTE on admission to hos-
pital and received appropriate prophylaxis12. They concluded that 
a nationwide system was needed in the NHS to identify patients 
at risk of VTE on admission to hospital as well as taking steps to 
ensure that appropriate thrombo-prophylaxis was prescribed unless 
contra-indicated.
As a result a financial incentive for hospitals to focus on VTE 
risk assessment and prevention was introduced through the Com-
missioning for Quality and Innovation for Payment Framework 
(CQUIN) for 2010–201113. A percentage of CQUIN payments paid 
to or withheld from acute providers became conditional on risk 
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assessing for VTE at least 90% of patients admitted to hospital as 
in-patients. As well as acting as a monitor for ensuring delivery of 
risk assessment procedures, this measure also supported VTE pre-
vention by providing a pan-NHS picture of compliance.
There are also national requirements for all acute hospitals to un-
dertake and report a monthly audit of the percentage of their pa-
tients who have received appropriate thrombo-prophylaxis after 
risk assessment and undertake a root cause analysis of confirmed 
cases of hospital acquired VTE. Further audit requirements include 
the reassessment of risk after 24 hours and the provision of patient 
information on VTE prevention. Compliance with all these indica-
tors is measured from a nationally mandated monthly Unify2 data 
collection for all providers of NHS acute services. Failure to report 
in line with such contractual obligations allows commissioners to 
withhold a percentage of contract value.
Paradoxes and contradictions within the CQUIN 
payment framework
What is interesting about the CQUIN payment framework is that it 
enables commissioners to reward excellence by linking a propor-
tion of English healthcare providers’ income to the achievement of 
local quality improvement goals. Unlike incentive systems that re-
ward individuals, CQUIN rewards are made available to providers 
through contracts with primary care trusts (PCTs). CQUIN funding 
is up to 1.5% of contract outturn value, conditional upon achieve-
ment of quality outcomes specified in the contract. The contract 
outturn value is a locally agreed package of quality improvement 
goals and indicators, which, if achieved enables the provider to earn 
its full CQUIN payment (calculated as 1.5% of the actual outturn 
value of the provider contract). The financial value of a CQUIN 
scheme is specified nationally as a % of actual outturn value of the 
provider’s contract. At the start of the year, the expected value of 
the scheme should be calculated as a % of the estimated total out-
turn contract value for commissioned patient services. A year-end 
reconciliation is then required against actual outturn value13.
Therefore, it might be questioned what motivates individuals work-
ing for PCTs to successfully implement local quality improvement 
goals when they have no personal benefit in terms of monetary re-
ward. The following section discusses different types of motivation 
and how each may act as either a barrier or facilitator to the suc-
cessful implementation of such ‘payment by results’ schemes in the 
wider NHS.
Motivation in the NHS
In virtually every developed country the health service is the largest 
single employer, and Britain is no exception. The desire to increase 
capacity within the NHS means that it has probably never been 
more important to understand what attracts, retains and motivates 
staff14. The ninth annual survey to collect the views of NHS staff 
across England was published in 2011. It indicated that 90% of staff 
felt their role ultimately made a difference to patients, and 87% 
were satisfied with the quality of care they personally gave15.
Yet, despite the individual (subjective) needs of each patient it may 
be argued that standardisation of effective clinical practice is becom-
ing more commonplace. Risk assessing for VTE is one example. 
It would prove extremely difficult for compliance to be rewarded 
unless a standardised, objective system of directly comparable out-
put existed. Revised NICE guidance in January 2010 formalised 
differing hospital guidelines for attributing VTE risk, administering 
appropriate prophylaxis and dealing with contraindications. This 
meant that compliance against a national target was now able to be 
monitored for every acute provider. As a result, directly measurable 
financial incentives for acute providers to focus on VTE risk as-
sessment and prevention through the CQUIN payments framework 
were able to be introduced on a nationwide basis.
It would appear to be a rational assumption that offering any form 
of financial incentivisation should drive up employee compliance 
with new or revised working practices. An employee’s motivation 
to perform effectively is said to be determined by two variables16. 
The first is contained in the effort-reward probability. This is deter-
mined by two further probabilities:
1. The probability that effort will result in performance.
2. The probability that performance will result in reward.
Yet, this would appear to be paradoxical to the aims of CQUIN. 
Here we see quite clearly that an increased effort by individuals 
to properly risk assess and treat VTE in hospital in-patients is not 
financially rewarding to themselves, but to the provider for whom 
they work.
What the CQUIN framework appears to have tried to do is to bridge 
the gap between individual and organisational reward by creating 
and rewarding a culture of continuous quality improvement with 
stretching goals and measured outcomes agreed in contracts with 
PCTs on an annual basis. Despite there being no individual reward 
through CQUIN to comply with increasing national guidance (in-
cluding VTE risk assessment and treatment) for most healthcare 
professionals, different, less extrinsic motivational factors must in-
fluence uptake and compliance. These are discussed below:
1. In the case of Trust chief executives their pay and continuity in 
their post are often tied to the trust achieving certain targets. Since 
2001, public sector hospitals have been given ‘star ratings’ accord-
ing to their performance on targets and other indicators17. These 
public service targets in health have commonly become known as 
“P45” targets - if you do not achieve set targets then your job may 
be at risk17. The total reward package for Trust chief executives 
commonly includes basic pay, a spot rate salary determined by the 
role and an organisational weighting factor alongside an annual per-
formance bonus scheme18. CQUIN may be said to be one of those 
targets on which performance rewarded pay for chief executives is 
based. As a crude form of motivation it may be promulgated that if 
hospitals do not achieve their targets then the employment of the 
Trust chief executive may be at risk. Clearly this will have an impact 
on performance.
2. However, we may posit that for clinicians who do not receive 
any form of performance bonus like Trust chief executives, their 
motivational reasons for complying with NICE guidance may be 
more complex. Intrinsically, a concern for the welfare and treat-
ment of patients has always been an over-riding factor in driving 
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up standards in healthcare delivery. The NHS staff survey data for 
2011 indicated that nine out of ten staff felt that their role made a 
difference to patients, with 69% saying they were able to deliver the 
quality of patient care to which they aspired15. What is interesting 
from the perspective of this paper is the reduction in the number of 
staff in the same survey indicating their satisfaction with the level of 
freedom they now have to chose their own working methods (61%, 
down from 63% in 201015). Here we may see the shift towards a 
greater standardisation of working practice against what were lo-
cally developed working practices for risk assessment and treat-
ment of VTE19.
3. As discussed earlier, CQUIN rewards are made available to pro-
viders through contracts with PCTs. Despite not rewarding the 
majority of individuals through personal rewards, the achievement 
of local quality improvement goals will increase overall hospital 
income. Because CQUIN funding is currently up to 1.5% of con-
tract outturn value, conditional upon the achievement of quality 
outcomes specified in the contract20, by achieving CQUIN goals 
healthcare professionals may be incentivised to adopt revised work-
ing practices in order to ‘earn’ extra monies at a departmental level 
in order to both improve their working practices and increase pa-
tient satisfaction. These may have taken the form of the employ-
ment of a lead specialist VTE nurse or improved staff and patient 
education.
4. A further motivating factor for the improvement of VTE risk 
assessment and treatment might be through the increased surveil-
lance of clinical practice that the nationwide standardisation of 
VTE assessment now permits21. Not only does this allow for on-
going intra-organisational surveillance through mandatory audit 
activity, but inter-organisational, public comparison of how well 
different hospitals risk assess and treat VTE also becomes possible. 
Measurements against national targets such as VTE risk assessment 
and treatment are now reported in annual hospital reviews of per-
formance. As a result of increasing transparency in the outcomes 
of hospital performance, many healthcare professionals may have 
become increasingly aware of the need to drive up and maintain 
professional status by meeting local quality improvement goals in 
their hospitals.
This paper examines the organisational and workplace conditions 
that favour the implementation of national revised VTE guidance in 
2010 in four hospitals in the greater South West of England. In par-
ticular, it focuses on the attitudes of staff towards changes to VTE 
risk assessment policies upon which CQUIN targets were based.
The implementation of evidence-based national guidance on VTE 
prevention across two specialities (general medicine and orthopae-
dics) were systematically compared in four hospitals in 2009 and 
re-assessed for 2010. The review used 816 randomly selected lon-
gitudinal case studies of the hospitals’ VTE prevention activities 
(in each of the four hospital sites 51 records for orthopaedics and 
51 records for general medicine were audited for 2009 and 2010), 
complemented by a qualitative study into the practical responses by 
healthcare professionals to the revised national guidance and the 
imposition of payment by results (PbR). This paper suggests that 
in instances where there were unachievable clauses for achieving 
CQUIN rewards for VTE, there was less evidence of an improve-
ment in VTE risk assessment and appropriate prescribing of venous 
thromboembolism prophylaxis.
Research questions
Focussing on four hospital sites in NHS South West, our first re-
search question was:
1. To what extent did the recording of VTE risk assessment and the 
prescribing of appropriate thrombo-prophylaxis increase after the 
imposition of revised NICE guidance in January 2010?
In so far as that did happen, we further ask:
2. In what respects was this increase a response to the financial 
incentives now available for acute providers through the CQUIN 
payment framework? Specifically:
a) What motivated staff to improve VTE risk assessment and pre-
vention when reward was given at the level of the organisation 
rather than the individual?
b) Does potential public exposure of how well a hospital does in 
terms of meeting CQUIN targets for VTE risk assessment and pre-
vention motivate staff to meet new NICE guidance, or:
c) Is concern for patient welfare at the forefront of staff motivation 
so any improvement in the recording of VTE risk assessment and 
prevention would have occurred even if incentivised payments were 
not in place?
Methods
In order to compare the differences in the implementation of evi-
dence-based national guidance on VTE prevention across general 
medicine and orthopaedics in four hospital study sites, a multi-
method approach was adopted. To examine staff motivation in 
implementing (or not) the NICE guidance on VTE, qualitative 
methods were necessary. We content-analysed interviews and lo-
cal documents expressing the attitudes, motives and rationales of 
the staff most responsible for implementing revised NICE guidance 
and meeting CQUIN targets. To examine how far staff in the study 
sites had in fact implemented the NICE guidance and responded 
to the CQUIN incentives, we extracted data from medical records.
Sampling
As study sites, we sampled four hospitals with initially divergent 
models of VTE prevention activity. For example, Hospital A fa-
voured universal prophylaxis with an ‘opt-out’ strategy where 
patients received prophylaxis unless contra-indicated. In contrast, 
Hospital C undertook early and ongoing risk assessment and only 
prescribed prophylaxis to patients with a clear, clinical need. Our 
sampling frame was a regional census undertaken in 2009 (refer-
ence not cited to protect anonymity of the sites) which reported or-
ganisational context and VTE prevention activity for each hospital.
It was decided to compare patients within general medicine and 
orthopaedics as it was hypothesised that a speciality with a rela-
tively high proportion of planned admissions (orthopaedics) would 
find it easier to implement the revised guidance than a speciality 
with a relatively high proportion of unplanned admissions (general 
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medicine). As we wanted to determine the extent to which the im-
position of national guidance on VTE risk assessment and treatment 
had influenced the development and risk assessment intervention 
in each hospital we decided to sample records over two years. To 
minimise the effects of both the seasonal inflows of tourists and the 
rotation of junior doctors our sample was drawn from a list of all 
adult admissions for stays over 24 hours for the same three-week 
period in October 2009 and 2010.
We sampled staff using a snowballing method. We started by in-
terviewing the medical and orthopaedics consultants leading VTE 
implementation and from their responses a care pathway for VTE 
risk assessment, prevention and treatment in each hospital site was 
able to be mapped. From this we were able to identify staff who 
made key decisions about VTE prevention and treatment during a 
hospital episode. These included: junior medical staff, VTE nurses, 
orthopaedic nurses, pre-operative assessment staff, pharmacists and 
senior hospital managers.
Each hospital approached our request to devise a sampling frame 
in different ways. Hospital A gave free access to admission data for 
the three week period in October from which we sampled the tar-
get population. Hospitals B, C and D would not release admission 
data but did provide a sample of patient files for audit. Subsequent 
statistical analysis confirmed that in those hospitals where we were 
unable to take our own sample, a random cross section of files ap-
peared to have been made available without having been ‘cherry-
picked’ by hospital records departments in order to show 100% 
compliance with national VTE risk assessment in orthopaedics and 
general medicine. An unexpected, later opportunity to compare our 
statistical analysis of VTE risk assessment in one of the hospital 
sites with an internal audit undertaken by some ward pharmacists 
during 2010 appeared to substantiate that the ‘cherry-picking’ of 
files to indicate stronger compliance was not the case.
To examine how the NICE and CQUIN norms were actually im-
plemented we extracted from medical records the data shown on 
the data collection instrument (see data collection file). This was 
designed for mainly ‘tick-box’ entry of standard data entry fields. 
Power calculations indicated that a sample of 408 patients across all 
four hospitals for each year would be sufficient to detect an increase 
from 50% compliance in 2009 to 60% in 2010 with 80% power at 
the 5% level of significance. Data from 2009 allowed a retrospec-
tive sample predating NICE guidance 2010, whilst 2010 data was 
a prospective sample following NICE guidance implementation. In 
all 816 medical records were sampled.
Data extraction and interview schedule
http://dx.doi.org/10.6084/m9.figshare.155791
Data collection
Case study data were collected by interviews with key informants. We 
started collecting data in 2009 by interviewing either the medical or 
orthopaedic consultant responsible for leading VTE implementation 
in each hospital. A care pathway for VTE prevention and treatment 
was then mapped for both orthopaedics and general medicine in 
each hospital site. From this we were able to identify key health-
care professionals who appeared integral to VTE risk assessment 
and treatment throughout a hospital episode. We were then able to 
snowball to interview these professionals whose roles included: 
VTE nurses, pharmacists, orthopaedic nurses, pre-operative assess-
ment staff and senior hospital managers. Forty four interviews were 
completed in the four hospitals over an 18 month period between 
March 2010 and July 2011. These were broken down hospital by 
hospital as follows: 11 each for Hospitals A and B; 10 for Hospi-
tal C and 12 for Hospital D. At certain times in Hospital A, time 
constraints in a busy Acute Assessment Unit meant that some in-
terviews were undertaken with two members of staff at the same 
time. Fifty professionals were interviewed in total across the four 
hospitals. A semi-structured interview schedule was used (see 
interview schedule file). The interviews described the pre-NICE 
2009 systems and reported how each hospital had responded to the 
2010 NICE guidance and what factors appeared to facilitate or hin-
der compliance. All the interviews with key informants lasted ap-
proximately one hour and were conducted on a face-to-face basis in 
the four hospitals by SC or OB.
Data analysis
Each interview was transcribed and checked for accuracy by the re-
spondent. We used framework analysis by collating our interview 
data into tables for each hospital whose rows were categories that re-
flected our research questions. This approach enabled us to immedi-
ately ascertain whether there were any unforeseen emergent patterns 
in the data that necessitated us revising our initial assumptions. To 
check for accuracy, anonymised empirical findings were presented to 
the thrombosis committee in three out of the four sites – A, C and D.
Hospital characteristics
A hospital can be awarded exemplar status as a ‘kite-mark’ of qual-
ity and good practice in VTE care. As part of the award they are 
expected to share examples of good practice, educational and audit 
material as well as providing advice on VTE care. A further expec-
tation is that they collaborate on clinical research into VTE with 
other exemplar centres and develop innovate VTE prevention prac-
tices. In June 2010, there were sixteen VTE exemplar centres span-
ning the UK20, including two of our hospitals (A and D).
Hospital A is a teaching hospital with over 900 beds. More than 
48,000 patients pass through its doors every week. It provides a full 
range of acute and general hospital services for nearly half a million 
people. Speciality services are available to a greater population of 
over two million people. It employs approximately 5400 full-time 
staff. After becoming a Department of Health VTE exemplar site in 
2009 it created a post of VTE Clinical Nurse Specialist to ensure 
it continued to comply with VTE risk assessment and disseminate 
best practice across the Trust.
Hospital B has over 750 beds spread between three geographically 
dispersed and semi-remote, rural sites (with the main site under-
taking over 90% of the Trusts activity). It serves a population of 
450,000 people (often doubled by holidaymakers at the busiest 
times of the year) and employs approximately 5200 staff. The recent 
opening of a new medical teaching facility had further enhanced its 
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strong reputation for education and training. It was in the process of 
applying for Foundation Trust status at the time of this investigation.
Hospital C was one of the UK’s first foundation trust hospitals and 
provides acute hospital services to around 350,000 people as well 
as offering specialist services to a much larger population of ap-
proximately two million. Across all of its numerous sites it has over 
30 wards, 20 operating theatres, 850 inpatient beds and 80 day-case 
beds. It employs approximately 6700 staff. There are over 310,000 
consultant-led outpatient attendances per year and 120,000 day 
case admissions per year. It also has teaching hospital status.
Hospital D has foundation trust status and is much smaller in scale 
than the other three hospitals. It is not a teaching hospital and serves 
a population of approximately 225,000 spread across three neigh-
bouring counties. Specialist services such as burns, plastic surgery, 
genetics and rehabilitation extend to more than three million people 
within a greater geographical area. It employs around 3900 full and 
part-time staff and had been awarded Department of Health exem-
plar status for VTE in 2009 (like Hospital A). It continued to be at 
the forefront nationally on VTE prevention and hosted a national 
VTE conference in 2010.
Ethical considerations
Ethical approval was not needed for this study as the local NHS 
Research and Development Service deemed it to be service evalua-
tion and audit. Honorary contracts for the two researchers (SC and 
OB) were necessary in three of the four hospitals (B, C and D). The 
fourth hospital (A) only required a letter of access.
All four hospitals were assured that both they and individual inform-
ants would not be identifiable in both data analysis and publications. 
Researcher safety was addressed by ensuring that someone within 
the team had knowledge of the date, time and place of interviews.
Findings
1. Increase in the recording of VTE risk assessment and prescribing 
of appropriate thrombo-prophylaxis.
All four sites show an improvement in the percentage of patients 
risk assessed for VTE between 2009 and 2010. Table 1 shows the 
overall pattern of convergence with NICE requirements for VTE 
risk assessment and the amount of CQUIN monies available for 
each hospital if local quality improvement goals were met. It also 
indicates the percentage of CQUIN monies allocated to further im-
proving VTE risk assessment by paying for a Lead VTE Nurse or 
improving staff education in VTE.
The biggest overall percentage change in risk assessment was in 
Hospital A. This was not unexpected. Despite its low figure of 
43.1% for risk assessment in 2009, it had been awarded Depart-
ment of Health VTE exemplar site status in December 2008 due 
to its policy of prescribing universal pharmaceutical prophylaxis 
unless contra-indicated. However, poor documentation of risk 
assessment in patient files meant that we were unable to count that 
a VTE risk assessment had taken place for many patients for our 
audit purposes in 2009. This might begin to explain the low 43.1% 
statistic. Over the 12 months of our audit, it rose from last to first 
place for VTE risk assessment in the four hospitals in our study as 
auditable risk assessment rose to 90.2% in 2010. In contrast, Hospi-
tal D, also a Department of Health exemplar site for VTE pre-2010 
NICE guidance was the leading hospital in 2009 by risk assessing 
71.6% of inpatients for VTE. Only a small improvement was able 
to be statistically shown for 2010 as auditable risk assessments rose 
to 74.5%. Again, we were only able to count patient files where 
there was written evidence of an actual risk assessment being un-
dertaken. This statistically non-significant shift in risk assessment 
might be explained by inaccurate recording of paperwork or poor 
filing of risk assessment documentation. However, Hospital D was 
the only hospital to not be eligible for CQUIN incentives and this 
may have affected the motivation for implementing the required na-
tional changes in completing VTE risk assessment documentation.
2. How far was the improvement in VTE risk assessment a response 
to the financial incentives paid to acute providers through CQUIN?
All hospitals had local VTE prevention policies in place before 
national guidance was introduced in 2010. Three of the hospitals 
(B, C and D) had developed policies that ultimately matched the 
national standards subsequently set by NICE in 2010. These poli-
cies were built on slightly differentiated risk assessments that were 
often individual for each specialism. For example in Hospital D, 
Obstetrics and Gynaecology used a VTE risk assessment they had 
developed from the Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecolo-
gists risk assessment tool rolled out in 200922. When questioned 
about the use of differing risk assessment forms across the hospital 
during interview, the chair of the thrombosis committee at Hospital 
D described these differentiated risk assessments thus:
“…(the) end output of the algorithm may vary by speciality but not 
the input.”
This suggests that risk factors across specialisms might vary, but the 
overarching aim to prevent VTE during a hospital episode remained 
consistent throughout the hospital. Prevention of venous thrombo-
embolism was therefore based on the cumulative risk factors of as-
sessment and treatment.
In contrast to Hospital D, Hospital A had developed an ‘opt-out’ pol-
icy where all patients (irrespective of admittance speciality) were 
given a standardised dose of pharmaceutical prophylaxis unless it 
has been contra-indicated. This ‘opt-out’ policy had originally been 
devised by the thrombosis committee following a national campaign 
around the preventable risks of VTE. However, such a blanket policy 
meant individual risk assessment for VTE was not always officially 
recorded in hospital notes nor, therefore, reflected in our compliance 
scores (as shown in Table 1) for 2009 (which appeared to be low 
in comparison to Hospitals B, C and D). As new drug charts were 
introduced in Hospital A during 2010 which included VTE risk as-
sessment proformas that needed to be completed before any drugs 
were prescribed, our audit was able to document a large increase in 
evidence of risk assessment from 43.1% in 2009 to 90.2% in 2010.
Our analysis appears to support the suggestion that the imposition 
of national guidelines for VTE risk assessment in 2010 acted as the 
driving force behind the significant improvements in the recording 
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of risk assessment in Hospital A between 2009 and 2010 as outlined 
above. The recording of risk and prescription of appropriate VTE 
prophylaxis appeared to be further underpinned across all the hospi-
tals by the introduction of the CQUIN goal on VTE risk assessment.
Hospital A achieved all of its CQUIN targets for VTE risk assess-
ment, resulting in the reward of £500,000 to the hospital operating 
budget. A member of its VTE committee suggested that as the hos-
pital had performed so well with meeting current CQUIN standards, 
the PCT would be very unlikely to include as many targeted criteria 
in following years. The hospital would probably achieve them all 
thereby making financial incentives too expensive to finance. When 
asked in early 2012 if any of the £500,000 CQUIN monies had been 
directly received by the thrombosis committee to improve VTE risk 
assessment or treatment the committee member replied:
“The VTE prevention initiative has received nothing from the Trust 
so far but talks are in progress.”
Hospital B also received payment for achieving CQUIN targets for 
VTE. The 2010–2011 VTE figure was approximately £400,000. 
However, as was the case in Hospital A, the Chief Haematologist 
at Hospital B said:
“…not a penny has come to our department [haematology] as I 
have been told there is no linkage between the monies and its use 
in the specified area.”
In Hospital C the value of the Trust’s VTE CQUIN reward for VTE 
was in the region of £300,000. In line with our findings in Hospitals 
A and B, the VTE CQUIN monies earned to date in Hospital C 
had not been used to explicitly invest in VTE assessment. However, 
an electronic system for capturing VTE risk assessment was in the 
course of development but the hospital was unable to confirm if re-
search and development monies for this initiative had come directly 
from CQUIN payments.
However, what was very interesting from the point of view of our 
research was that Hospital D was found to differ significantly from 
the previous hospitals discussed above as they were said to have 
experienced a ‘difficult relationship’ with their PCT over a number 
of years and:
“…therefore one of the consequences of that is an unachievable 
clause for achieving VTE CQUIN money has been set into the con-
tract which is outside our control and that is ambulance response 
times on patients who require thrombolysis.” (Lead Clinician for 
Haematology, Hospital D).
This resulted in no CQUIN monies being made available to the hos-
pital whether they achieved CQUIN targets or not.
Despite the improvements in VTE risk assessment and prevention 
discussed above, it remains difficult to ascertain with certainty if 
monetary incentives were the driving force behind the significant 
changes in the percentages of patients risk assessed between 2009 
and 2010 in each hospital. We used interview analysis to try and 
determine if a more intrinsic type of motivation in driving up pa-
tient safety might explain the improvements in risk assessment. A 
Lead Anti-Coagulant Nurse from Hospital B suggested that CQUIN 
incentives were actually a crude form of payment by results. His 
concern appeared to focus on whether any monies obtained by 
CQUIN would be used to improve VTE risk assessment by em-
ploying more staff (as evidenced by Hospital A using the funding 
to employ a Lead VTE Nurse) or simply swallowed into general 
operating budgets:
“I think in the current financial climate you need to be realistic that 
money will be absorbed but at the same time… it’s a fairly signifi-
cant amount and you would not need every penny of that money to 
deliver an effective VTE role. I think what you need is the hospital 
to be able to say we are prepared to spend what is needed to achieve 
it and whatever is left over we will absorb that as a hospital. That’s 
acceptable.”
Certainly in the three hospitals eligible for VTE CQUIN funding 
all monies had indeed been swallowed into the general operating 
budget so it was difficult to ascertain whether extrinsic motivation 
in the form of payment by results drove increased compliance to 
NICE guidance.
We suggest that hospitals were not using CQUIN rewards to im-
prove the patient experience by allocating CQUIN payments to 
specific departments. Indeed interview data from a Pre-Operative 
Assessment Nurse in Hospital B suggest that even when CQUIN 
Table 1. Risk assessment changes in all hospitals between 2009 and 2010 and CQUIN targets for each.
Site All Hospital A Hospital B Hospital C Hospital D
2009 – % of patients risk assessed for VTE 51.5 43.1 58.8 32.4 71.6
2010 – % of patients risk assessed for VTE 79.2 90.2 83.3 68.6 74.5
Significance (p<0.05) + + + + 0
VTE Clinical Nurse Specialist in Post? n/a Yes No No No
CQUIN target payments in £000s n/a 500 400 300 Not eligible
CQUIN target achieved? n/a Yes Yes Yes n/a
Any CQUIN monies used to improve VTE risk assessment? n/a No No No n/a
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targets were met the amount of time being allowed for VTE risk 
assessment in all sites had since been reduced to allow for a greater 
volume of patient activity, whilst at the same time staff were be-
ing expected to increase their recording and frequency of VTE risk 
assessment in order to comply with national guidelines on which 
CQUIN rewards were based:
“…our processes have changed quite considerably in the past three 
or four years to actually increase the throughput of patients that we 
see… historically… the doctors that were in clinic would always do 
a risk assessment [for VTE] so you would always see the bottom of 
the prescription chart you know – high risk – and then we would 
measure for the TED stockings but we don’t now.” (Sister at Pre-
Operative Assessment Clinic, Hospital B).
This finding appears to fit with the NHS Staff Survey (2010), which 
suggests that just under half of all staff (46%, up from 45% in 2010) 
felt they do not have enough time to carry out their work and 42% 
indicated they could not meet all the conflicting demands on their 
time at work. Yet, paradoxically, 87% of staff indicated they were 
satisfied with the quality of care provided to patients15.
Conclusions
The research–practice gap is widely documented. It can be ex-
tremely difficult to implement even those strategies (such as risk 
assessing for VTE) that are known to carry large health benefits into 
the healthcare system. The general goal of VTE risk assessment for 
all patients appears to have been transformed into a metric-specific 
aim statement with the process measure defined as 90% risk assess-
ment of all in-patients. Despite this, recent figures from the Depart-
ment of Health show that since national measures were introduced 
in 2010, patients are now twice as likely to be risk assessed for 
VTE. More than 14.3 million patients have been risk assessed since 
the measure was put in place, and an estimated 230,000 patients are 
being screened per week. So our findings appear to match events in 
the NHS more widely.
As our data show, the introduction of CQUIN targets has focussed 
the attention of hospital management towards improving the re-
cording of risk assessment and the prescribing of appropriate VTE 
prophylaxis. The role of CQUIN has been re-emphasised as being a 
key mechanism for delivering the improvements identified as mark-
ers of quality by NICE quality standards. However, there appears to 
remain a contradiction between the more traditional, extrinsically 
motivated payment by results, to reduce waiting times and increase 
the volume of work completed in a given period, and the develop-
ment of a more intrinsically motivated effective patient experience 
by driving up standards. The improvements in VTE risk assessment 
between 2009 and 2010 in each hospital suggests that the imple-
mentation of national clinical guidelines for VTE risk assessment 
and appropriate prescribing of prophylaxis appears to have signifi-
cantly changed the attitudes and behaviour of healthcare profes-
sionals towards VTE risk assessment. In turn, this has increased 
compliance with national guidelines. However, it is very difficult 
to separate whether improvements in VTE risk assessment and the 
prescribing of appropriate thrombo-prophylaxis has increased due 
to risk assessment for VTE becoming a national performance indi-
cator underpinned by the introduction of a national CQUIN goal 
on VTE risk assessment (motivated by the potential of extrinsic 
financial reward) or through the continuous improvement in the 
risk management of VTE in each hospital (intrinsic motivation). 
The increased measurement and risk assessment and the increased 
transparency of clinical practice appear to have created what propo-
nents of Foucault (a 20th century philosopher who focussed on the 
methods by which power is conveyed in society), call a ‘discipli-
nary’ motive for compliance with NICE and CQUIN norms23. Such 
motives are certainly intrinsic but not in the positive way that the 
original theorists of intrinsic motivation seem to have had in mind.
Certainly increased levels of risk assessment and prophylaxis for 
VTE are evident from our study, but once again, it is difficult to es-
tablish with certainty whether clinical activity has actually changed, 
or simply the recording of it. Whether a year is long enough for the 
full impact of guideline implementation to be apparent is difficult 
to say, although our audit of medical records does show substantial 
changes in the numbers of patients being risk assessed and appro-
priately treated. Our study appears to mirror that of Tharvarajah and 
Wetherill who found that by attaching a VTE risk assessment tool 
to drug charts significant improvements in the recording of risk as-
sessment can be observed24.
What would be interesting for future investigation would be wheth-
er the focus of hospital management to comply with national policy 
guidance on VTE risk assessment and prophylaxis remains after the 
financial ‘carrot’ of CQUIN monies has been withdrawn. To what 
extent are we able to determine whether the culture of VTE risk as-
sessment will have become so entrenched in the working practices 
of healthcare professionals that we will continue to see compliance 
with quality guidelines that may no longer be rewarded financially?
Author contributions
SC drafted the manuscript with input from all the authors. SC, RS 
and OB designed the study and CAG supervised the overall study. 
All authors were involved in the revision of the draft manuscripts 
and have agreed the final content.
Competing interests
No competing interests were disclosed.
Grant information
The author(s) declared that no grants were involved in supporting 
this work.
Acknowledgements
SC, RS and AB are currently employed by the National Institute for 
Health Research (NIHR) Collaboration for Leadership in Applied 
Health Research and Care for the South West Peninsula (PenCLAH-
RC). Support from the NIHR in England for SC’s, RS’s and AB’s 
contribution is gratefully acknowledged. The views expressed in 
this publication are those of the author(s) and not necessarily those 
of the NHS, the NIHR or the Department of Health in England.
Page 9 of 12
F1000Research 2013, 2:41 Last updated: 23 SEP 2013
References
1. Busse R, Schreyogg J, Smith PC: Hospital case payment systems in Europe. 
Health Care Manag Sci. 2006; 9(3): 211–213. 
PubMed Abstract 
2. Schreyogg J, Stargardt T, Tiemann O, et al.: Methods to determine 
reimbursement rates for diagnosis related groups (DRG): A comparison of 
nine European countries. Health Care Manag Sci. 2006; 9(3): 215–223. 
PubMed Abstract | Publisher Full Text 
3. Department of Health: The NHS Plan. A Plan for Reinvestment. A Plan for 
Reform. 2000. 
Reference Source
4. Department of Health Payment by Results team: A simple guide to payment by 
results. 2011. 
Reference Source
5. Maybin J: Payment by Results. 2007.
6. CSP: Payment By Results. The New funding system for the NHS in England. 
Practical Support for Allied Health Professionals. 2005. 
Reference Source
7. Department of Health: High Quality Care For All. NHS Next Stage Review Final 
Report Summary. 2008.
8. Manchester City Council CQUIN Payments - (Commissioning for Quality and 
Innovation (CQUIN) payment framework). 2011.
9. Geerts W: Prevention of venous thromboembolism: a key patient safety 
priority. J Thromb Haemost. 2009; 7(Suppl 1): 1–8. 
PubMed Abstract | Publisher Full Text 
10. Douketis JD, Moinuddin I: Prophylaxis against venous thromboembolism in 
hospitalized medical patients: an evidence-based and practical approach. Pol 
Arch Med Wewn. 2008; 118(4): 209–15. 
PubMed Abstract 
11. House of Commons Health Committee: The Prevention of Venous 
Thromboembolism in Hospitalised Patients. HMSO: London 2005. 
Reference Source
12. Lindblad B, Sternby NH, Bergqvist D: Incidence of venous thromboembolism 
verified by necropsy over 30 years. BMJ. 1991; 302(6778): 709–711. 
PubMed Abstract | Free Full Text 
13. Department of Health: Using the Commissioning for Quality and Innovation 
(CQUIN) payment framework - A summary guide. 2010. 
Reference Source
14. Elliott B: Labour markets in the NHS an agenda for research. Health Econ. 2003; 
12(10): 797–801. 
PubMed Abstract | Publisher Full Text 
15. The Department of Health: NHS Staff Ninth Annual Survey. 2011. 
Reference Source
16. Edward E, Lawler I: Job Design and Employee Motivation. Pers Psychol. 1969; 
22(4): 426–435. 
Publisher Full Text 
17. Hood C: Gaming in Targetworld: The Targets Approach to Managing British 
Public Services. Public Adm Rev. 2006; 66(4): 515–521. 
Publisher Full Text 
18. Department of Health: Pay Framework for Very Senior Managers in Strategic 
and Special Health Authorities, Primary Care Trusts and Ambulance Trusts. 
2012. 
Reference Source
19. Sheaff R: A Synthetic Discipline; preventing venous thrombo-embolism in 
hospital in-patients. 2012 (Forthcoming).
20. King's Thrombosis Centre: Venous Thromboembolism Prevention. A Guide for 
Delivering the CQUIN goal, R. Arya and B. Hunt, Editors. 2010. 
Reference Source
21. Timmermans S, Berg M: The Gold Standard: The Challenge of Evidence-Based 
Medicine and Standardization in Health Care. Philadelphia: Temple University 
2003. 
Reference Source
22. Royal College of Obstetricans and Gynaecologists: Reducing the risk of 
thrombosis and embolism during pregnancy and the puerperium. 2009. 
Reference Source
23. Ferlie E, Mcgivern G, FitzGerald L: A New Mode of Organizing in Health Care? 
Governmentality and Managed Networks in Cancer Services in England. Soc 
Sci Med. 2012; 74(3): 340–347. 
PubMed Abstract | Publisher Full Text 
24. Thavarajah D, Wetherill M: Implementing NICE guidelines on risk assessment 
for venous thromboembolism. Failure, success and controversy. Int J Health 
Care Qual Assur. 2012; 25(7): 618–624. 
PubMed Abstract | Publisher Full Text 
Page 10 of 12
F1000Research 2013, 2:41 Last updated: 23 SEP 2013
F1000Research
  Current Referee Status:
Referee Responses for Version 1
 Lynda Bonner
King's Thrombosis Centre, Kings College Hospital NHS Foundation Trust, London, UK
Approved: 28 February 2013
 28 February 2013Referee Report:
This is an interesting mixed methods study. It provides a comprehensive background to incentive
payments (payment by volume and payment by results) in the NHS. The authors mention that compliance
with VTE CQUIN targets 2010-11 was measured through a monthly audit of patients who received
appropriate thrombo-prophylaxis after risk assessment, however, it is worth adding that the financial
incentive for reaching a 90% threshold for VTE risk assessment was based on  data collectioncensus
and that Unify2 contains data on the VTE risk assessment indicator only. 
The section on motivation in the NHS is particularly relevant to those who are in a position to use CQUIN
as a driver to lead the implementation of effective VTE prevention practice in their organisation. The
power of CQUIN relies on its meaningful translation of its implications for staff within the healthcare
organisation. The authors give examples of how CQUIN can act as a motivator to engage different staff
groups that have a role in VTE prevention and suggest that there was less evidence of improvement
where unachievable clauses for achieving CQUIN rewards existed. This highlights the importance of
commissioners and providers agreeing realistic targets to activate the motivational potential of CQUIN. 
The study methodology appears justified and sound. Any limitations in methodology were acknowledged
and where possible action was taken to minimise their potential impact. Ethical issues were considered
and authorisation for the study was granted by the appropriate authorities. Findings are discussed within
the wider context of practice nationally and debate created around the intrinsic/extrinsic motivations that
may have been triggered by payment by results. 
It might be worth reflecting on the authors positive view of CQUIN as a financial ' ' and whether thiscarrot
may have influenced their interpretation of findings related to motivation. (This is in contrast to the more
negative view held by some that CQUIN is a financial ' ' whereby monies allocated for an organisationstick
will be withheld if they are unable to meet their targets). The snowball sampling technique could have
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This study adds to the current knowledge base and its findings support a positive correlation between a
statistically significant improvement in the percentage of patients risk assessed for VTE and the
achievement of CQUIN payments amongst the study sample. It also offers an insight into the perceptions
of CQUIN as a motivator and acknowledges that further research in the area is needed. It should be of
genuine interest to those in the field of VTE prevention or to those who are aiming to achieve CQUIN
payments for their organisation.
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managers of NHS Trusts to support clinicians in their bid to innovate for patient safety, or comply
with national quality improvement guidance.  
Methodology – I have not reviewed the power calculations, but the overall approach is sound.
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questions 2b and 2c.
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